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Abstract 
 
The starting point of this article is that the ultimate objective of sociology so far as the study 
of leisure is concerned should be with understanding the ways in which twenty-first century 
modern men and women attempt to reconcile the demands of individuality and community 
(aka freedom and security) by focusing on what they choose to do when they can do anything 
at all. The first introductory part sets up the rest of the article by offering a brief critique of 
the sociology of leisure which operates with the somewhat startling assertion that in modern 
societies leisure is largely consumerist in orientation and that as a result freedom is a fiction. 
Counteracting this assertion with a startling one of its own it is subsequently argued that the 
twentieth century interregnum saw modernity radically revise its modernity which led to a 
transformation in the power of human agency and emergence of the insistent voice ‘I too am 
in individual’. Taking as its starting point Peter Sloterdijk’s reading of Nietzsche’s imperative 
to ‘Become who you are’ articulated passionately in his book You must change your life 
(2013), the second part of the article argues that in the twenty-first century terms like 
authentic leisure and consumerist leisure, work and leisure are not antithetical to one another, 
and there is a radical need to rethink how people give meaning and order to their lives though 
their leisure pursuits. Here the article explores the relationship between Sloterdijk’s concept 
of anthropotechnics, the art of living and leisure. The next part of the article fleshes out the 
theory of devotional leisure which is one part of a more embracing project set out in the book 
Re-imagining leisure studies (Blackshaw 2017).  Here the article explores two contrasting 
ways of understanding devotional leisure practice, namely ‘devotional leisure’ and 
‘performative leisure’ by drawing respectively on the examples of surfing and car cruising. 
The article concludes with an attempt to reconcile these two seemingly contradictory forms 
of devotional leisure practice with a discussion of urban exploration, speculating that their 
uniqueness to one another is never absolute, and the more you perceive their particularity, the 
more you understand their double nature, as simultaneously aspects of a third endeavour.  
 
Key words anthropotechnics, art of living, community, ‘devotional leisure’, freedom, 
heterotopia, interregnum, khôra, ‘performative leisure’, skholē 
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Introduction 
 
It was over a century ago that Friedrich Nietzsche made his famous attacks on the 
abstractness and artificiality of the academic philosophy of his day and called for an impious 
alternative which would do justice to the most important concern of any free person which, as 
he said, is to ‘Become who you are’. What Nietzsche was offering here was celebration of 
‘human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create 
themselves’ (1974, 335). As he was very much aware there had been answer to this appeal 
with the birth of the rationalistic Enlightenment at the onset of modernity. But the optimism 
about the emancipatory potential of that positive age had waned considerably by the 
twentieth century not least because of the vacillations of modern capitalism which had 
brought recurring economic crises and the slaughter of thousands in two world wars. Even 
during the brief period of optimism in the middle of twentieth century when capitalism 
appeared to have finally secured economic stability and high standards of living seemed to be 
in the grasp of most (if not all), the majority of critical scholars doggedly adhered to 
Gramsci’s (1971, 276) gloomy observation that ‘a great variety of morbid symptoms appear’.  
In common with Weber (‘iron cage’ rationality), Georg Simmel (the ‘tragedy of culture’) and 
Marx (‘commodity fetishism’) they were tormented about what they saw as a new age of 
disenchantment in which capitalism, with its goal of continuous accumulation in the pursuit 
of profit, was viciously infiltrating every area of social and cultural life, and especially our 
leisure.  
 
This temper was perhaps best articulated by Herbert Marcuse in his classic study One-
dimensional man, published in 1964, which suggested that if leisure flourishes in modern 
society, it is essentially ‘unfree’ since it has been reduced to a low-level form of 
consumerism. Marcuse concluded that by the middle of the twentieth century leisure had two 
functions (MacIntyre, 1970). On the one hand, its role is to placate material needs that might 
otherwise lead to social disorder; and in so doing, it ensures that these needs encourage 
identification with the established order of things, on the other. The motors underpinning this 
process, Marcuse argued, are technological advances and invidious management strategies 
which work in tandem to disguise social differences and inequalities: ‘If the worker and his 
boss enjoy the same television program and visit the same resort places, if the typist is as 
attractively made up as the daughter of her employer…, if they all read the same newspaper, 
then this assimilation indicates not the disappearance of classes, but the extent to which the 
needs and satisfactions that serve the preservation of the Establishment are shared by the 
underlying population’ (Marcuse 2002, 10).  Marcuse thus understood modern leisure as part 
of a flattening out process of culture, a collapse of the two-dimensional into the one-
dimensional. 
 
Over the last forty or so years, Marcuse’s pessimism has been reflected in a series of critical 
studies in the sociology of leisure – from the perspectives of Marxism and Feminism to those 
drawing on the insights of contemporary sociologists such as Baudrillard, Bourdieu and 
Bauman – lamenting the ubiquity of consumer culture in a wide range of leisure domains. As 
I have argued previously, for all their strengths in laying bare the impact of hegemonic 
consumer culture on leisure too many of these studies have tended to underestimate the 
individuals they suppose are in thrall of consumerism, while simultaneously overestimating 
the grip of modern ‘iron cage’ rationalization systems. There is no doubt that for many people 
in modern societies the meaning of leisure inevitably seems to lie in the unalloyed pleasure 
and happiness they find in consuming, but in my view there is little question that what 
Nietzsche expressed all those years ago is a deeply rooted human need that is still widely felt. 
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Perhaps in their leisure pursuits it is not consuming that people are really after at all, but the 
pursuit of life itself – its highs and lows, frustrations and disappointments, the inevitable 
mixture of partial successes and unfulfilled dreams – and that is this what really counts. What 
this suggests to me is that the meaning of life is perhaps the meaning of leisure. In other 
words, even if the meaning of life remains elusive, what we do in our free time presents us 
with myriad opportunities to snatch intimations of the absolute.  
 
For some while, and in a number of previous publications, I have been seeking to establish an 
approach to the sociology of leisure which departs in a substantial fashion from the existing 
critical traditions. My starting point is that the world of our lived existence, with which 
Nietzsche was concerned, is not as the sociology of leisure suggests a mere order of social 
class and gender constructions and top down consumer hegemony.  The reason why too many 
sociologists today still are inclined to credit themselves with this outdated wisdom is that 
sociology today inherits from Marxism of over a hundred years ago the pretension to possess 
a secure collection of heuristic concepts – categories which permit it to classify, comprehend 
and criticize the culture of our present age. However, human agency does not respect the 
divisions placed on it by sociologists. In other words, sociology too readily accepts the shapes 
that capitalism, patriarchy, racism and convention have forced on our lives. 
 
To understand the implications of social inequality for leisure we have to look at the present 
day context in which it takes place. This is the view that informed Weber’s (1992) critique of 
Marxism. Contrary to Marx, Weber argued that we should not only recognize that capitalism 
is centred on the market (rather than production), but also that there exists more than one type 
of capitalism.  The respective divisions between what kinds of leisure are available to the rich 
and poor, men and women, black and white may indeed often be very different. But as 
Bauman (2000) has convincingly argued being ‘poor’ under the auspices of contemporary 
capitalism is radically different to being ‘poor’ under the auspices of 'producer' capitalism in 
the sense that it is experienced in a world in which contingency takes the place of necessity. 
One of the upshots of this is that old forms that used to explain social inequality no longer 
provide accurate insights of our experiences – there is too much of a slippage between word 
and world.  
 
The truth is that today, notwithstanding our social origins, we expect more from life than our 
forebears did. We get frustrated or feel let down when our expectations rub up against much 
the same, but the difference in the twenty-first century is that we don’t succumb. Instead, in 
order to try to shape our lives on our own terms, we stand up and fight. That TINA dictum, 
‘There Is No Alternative’, is confronted daily by myriad tiny, irrepressible grenades that 
explode deep inside countless imaginations. Some of us are better placed, and for that reason 
more successful, than others in overcoming the obstacles that capitalism, consumerism, 
patriarchy, racism and convention have forced into our lives, but whatever cards we have 
been dealt we ensure that our destiny takes shape in a way that accords with our own sense of 
things. In this way we are able to find some agreement between what life throws at us and our 
own expectations. As Bauman suggests we must recognize first and foremost that 
 
Freedom of individual self-assertion, if combined with the generative personality, is 
capable of multiplying the material and spiritual affluence of the human world, and 
with it – and thanks to it – also the meaningfulness and moral quality of human 
existence and coexistence. Such a combination, if we succeed in the effort to substitute 
it for the present-day mode of self-creation and self-assertion based as they are on 
rivalry instead of collaboration, has a chance of preventing the demotion of humanity to 
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the level of a zero-sum game. Freedom of individual self-definition united with the 
practice of ‘excorporation’ is a warrant for growing richness and diversity of human 
potential – but also for enhancing the space of self-definition and self-constitution of all 
of us and each of us (Bauman, in Bauman and Raud, 2015, 129) 
 
Using some slightly different terminology to Bauman, Sloterdijk (2013) has suggested, 
following Nietzsche, that what makes modern people human is our openness to enchantment 
and the universal need to make our lives momentous in one way or another, to render life 
meaningful. It is my view that many of us attempt to realize our potential in the enchanted 
kingdom of leisure. To understand what this entails we must shift our critical focus away 
from the prevailing pessimistic mind-set in the sociology of leisure which implies cultural 
determinism, as though this were the only way history could have gone, or can go.  
 
It is my view that twenty-first century leisure has patterns of its own, quite distinct from those 
of the theories derived from the sociology of leisure. With the onset of the twentieth century 
interregnum AUTHOR DETAIL modernity radically revised its modernity. This was a 
revolution deeper than conjunctural change. With it three big things changed resulting in 
three types of revolution (Heller, 1998): everyday life, economic, and political. The 
revolution of everyday life resulted in self-emancipation and a renewed interest in the art of 
living, economic revolution in market fundamentalism (i.e. the rise of neoliberalism) and 
political revolution in the onset of ‘life politics’ or the ‘politics of self-actualization’ (Giddens 
1991).  If human life was to be changed there was no choice but to be radical. Things that 
modernity in its ‘solid’ incarnation did not like – ambiguity, contingency, multiplicity – now 
not only had to be lived with but had to be embraced. In other words, modernity was forced 
to rethink itself and imagine how it would work in a world where identity and belonging are 
complex, ambiguous, fluid and contingent.  
 
What this means for sociologists of leisure is that they must recognize that the different life-
worlds in which leisure takes  place have spatial, temporal, and existential orders of their own 
quite distinct from those that have been found in the objective systems of the sociology of 
leisure. After the interregnum leisure life-worlds are not only innumerable but are constituted 
by a different kinds of purposes and by a different kinds of meanings – to borrow Karl 
Spracklen’s (2009) terminology. And if they are to be explored and understood, they must be 
explored in different ways that will leave their distinctive features intact.  
In this article I have accepted these observations as a challenge, and in working out my 
answer, I draw on many sources and attempt to draw out a number of particular issues. It will 
be argued below that the emergence of what I term devotional leisure is crucial to the 
emancipation implicit in the spatial, temporal, and existential orders found in twenty-first 
century modernity. My aim is to show that devotional leisure, so far from being something 
secondary or reactionary, is the motor that sustains modern life. Indeed, so much is this so 
that sociologists of leisure must disabuse themselves of the habit of contrasting authentic 
leisure and consumerist leisure, and instead see leisure in a continuing process that 
encompasses both. In order to establish that contention, there is much in what follows about 
the limitations of extant sociology. It is argued that devotional leisure is leisure that may or 
may not be freed from the shackles of social class and gender and consumerism. It has its 
origins in the assumption, identified somewhere in Greek philosophy, that leisure ‘is 
rewarded differently by different persons, and varies according to the habit of the individual’. 
It is also argued that devotional leisure comes in two forms which can be fashioned as a 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
‘personality’ and are intrinsically bound up with their own versions of identity and belonging. 
These two contrasting ways of understanding, developed by historical agents and what I call 
‘devotional leisure’ and ‘performative leisure’ – two terms (or both) which stand as a rebuke 
to all absolutist ideas of identity and belonging –  I shall argue have been designed to 
establish two modes of existence fit for twenty-first century artists of life.  
The theory of devotional leisure is one part of a more embracing project set out in the book 
AUTHOR DETAIL, which as its title suggests is a radical deconstruction and reconstruction of 
leisure studies. It would be impossible fully to do it justice within the limits of this journal 
article. All that can be done is to try to extract from the details certain important narrative 
threads and general theses which are insisted upon by that theory and in the course of the 
examples used, and to infer from these what conclusions we might be able to draw from 
them. At the same time, lack of extended attention to certain specific concepts (such as 
interregnum, khôra, skholē) indicates neither a lack of appreciation nor avoidance of critique 
but rather constraints of space. 
 
Anthropotechnics (or the art of living) and leisure 
 
The crux of the theoretical framework underpinning the following discussion takes its 
inspiration and point of departure from Peter Sloterdijk’s book You must change your life 
(2013). In this book, which is an ode to human creativity and to the powerful grip of the 
narrative of human freedom, Sloterdijk celebrates the evocation of continually living as a 
person for the first time, of being prepared to change one’s life. The book is conceived as a 
parallel reading of Nietzsche’s imperative to ‘Become who you are’. While Sloterdijk 
brilliantly demonstrates a contemporary understanding and application of this imperative, this 
article attempts to illuminate the very same issues of interpretation by focusing on leisure as a 
particular kind of life practice that comes into its own in the twenty-first century. The 
following discussion is in this regard an interpretive account which tries to demonstrate what 
happens when social contingency comes over you, with the realization that the present is as it 
is but things could always be different, and that when this happens the world and your place 
in it is inevitably going to change.  
 
No words could better set the stage for such an exercise than the words ‘You must change 
your life’ that recognize the ‘fact that life is problematic shows that the shape of your life 
does not fit into life's mould’ – in Sloterdijk’s view, anyone who imagines their identity in 
any way fixed is an anachronism. ‘So You Must Change Your Life and, once your life does 
fit into the mould, what is problematic will disappear’ (Wittgenstein cited in Sloterdijk 2013: 
138-9). What is at stake here is a chance to grasp our present age in its full significance, since 
the refining and purifying work involved in changing your life holds the potential for 
unlocking new secrets about individual and collective human endeavours, including a 
reinvigoration of the ways by which we understand enchantment, in words such as ‘magical’, 
‘spiritual life’, devotion’, ‘aesthetics’, ‘ethics’, “ascetics’, ‘performativity’ – and, of course 
the one that often encompasses all of them, ‘leisure’.  
 
Consider the following assertion: leisure comes into its own as the form of life practice par 
excellence in the twenty-first century. This statement builds on Peter Sloterdijk’s (2013) view 
that we make ourselves through anthropotechnics: forms and networks of cognitive, physical 
and social training through which we live our lives and construct our worlds in the face of the 
uncertain risks presented to us by modern living and the certainties of death. It is my view 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
that uses of leisure are primary spheres of anthropotechnics. In these uses of leisure we 
perceive that we can become ourselves, in a radical way. 
 
Although individuals have been experimenting with new forms of life over the centuries, 
Sloterdijk argues, with the interregnum we now realize that we are ‘beings for whom being is 
a question’ who want to determine our own worlds rather than be determined by the social, 
economic, political or cultural situations in which we find ourselves.  Just as ‘producer’ 
modernity stood cognitively under the sign of the work ethic, twenty-first century our 
‘consumer’ modernity presents itself under the sign of ‘Mußt dein Leben ändern’ (‘You must 
change your Life’). Like Nietzsche, Sloterdijk celebrates the view that freedom does not 
await the arrival some kind of external liberator, but is available to individuals in this world 
at every moment.  
 
Vis-à-vis Max Weber (1992), Sloterdijk argues that what once entailed developing a union 
with God changed to the personalized and emotional notion of life practice. In this regard, 
contingent individuals are not interested in the ‘innerworldly asceticism’ associated with the 
work ethic as identified by Weber, but in anthropotechnics (Sloterdijk 2013). According to 
Sloterdijk, the human world is one that has a need for ‘spiritual regimens’ and the cultivation 
of matters relating to the body and the soul.  
 
It is religions, moral judgements or appeals to tradition that have historically tried to attend to 
this essential feature of our existence. The argument that this is the job best carried out by 
religion returned with a vengeance in the last decades of the twentieth century after the 
purported failure of the rationalistic Enlightenment. Sloterdijk argues that this view needs to 
be challenged since religion does not, in actual fact, exist.  
 
In pursuing this argument Sloterdijk argues that human beings are always subject to a sense 
‘verticality from above’ which after Nietzsche pronounced the death of God was revised into 
a new version that ‘permits a deeper understanding of the emergence of embodied 
improbability’ (2013, 86 ). This signalled a shift from the maxim ‘God told me’ to the human 
claim to miraculous powers. In the place of religion what exists today are only new kinds of 
discipleship (sometimes taking on fundamentalist tendencies) which must be understood as 
attempts to appropriate religion in order to fulfil human spiritual needs. This view assumes a 
dichotomy between believers and unbelievers, which in the modern world collapses. In place 
of this dichotomy, we should distinguish between those concerned with life practice (homo 
artista, homo repetitivus) and the untrained  – those other ‘last humans’, the ‘identicals’ or 
'conformists of being different' who prefer to retain the identity of the ‘super-habitus’ and 
safety of the ‘base camp’ (Sloterdijk, 2013). In other words, as individuals free to choose our 
own destinies we are entitled to choose ‘unfreedom’ should we really want to. The point is 
that we are all required to make a choice. For Agnes Heller, this requirement explains the 
groundless ground of freedom, or the idea that freedom doesn’t have any foundation, and the 
insight that we are compelled to take the existential leap. This leap cannot be explained 
sociologically, but only legitimated by the leap itself. Ultimately, this is the choice each one 
of us must take.  
 
In Sloterdijk’s (2013) view it is human beings who produce themselves as individuals, for we 
are existential beings who not only pose the question of our own existence but reproduce 
ourselves as personalities through our actions. For Sloterdijk self-realization is no longer a 
political ideal but a widespread reality. This does not indicate a loss of this phenomenon's 
importance; on the contrary, it reveals how the art of living has spread to influence all aspects 
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of life. Indeed, since the art of living has become commonplace in the twenty-first century 
those who create themselves have begun to appreciate the ordinary as well as the 
extraordinary. In fact, so argues Sloterdijk, the discovery of the ordinary has actually become 
the great subject of the art of living which actually proceeds from and in parallel with what he 
calls 'acrobatics'.  
 
In common with Max Weber, Sloterdijk (2013: 38) suggests that modernity must be 
understood as a process that radically secularizes life practice by removing spirituality from 
its religious context and replacing it, not in work, but in leisure. First, to borrow an insight 
from Debray (2007), Sloterdijk suggests that unbending reflexivity has led to a shift in the 
subjective centre of gravity from human consciousness to the realm of the corporeal, which is 
valued in and for itself and has a material significance to which we feel a sense of moral 
obligation. In other words, the legitimating reference for the work ethic is no longer spiritual 
(i.e. God tells me it is sacred) or an ideal (i.e. my consciousness tells me it is true) but effective 
(i.e. my body shows me it works).  This somatization of spirituality is best illustrated in sport:  
 
No one can be credible as a contemporary today, then, unless they sense how the 
performative dimension is overtaking the work dimension. Thus the sports system has 
developed into a multiverse with hundreds of secondary worlds, in which self-
referential motion, useless play, superfluous exertion and simulated fights celebrate 
their existence somewhat wilfully, in the clearest possible contrast to the utilitarian 
objectivism of the working world (Sloterdijk 2013, 212-3). 
 
This first kind of spirituality is accompanied by a second tendency, what Sloterdijk calls the 
‘informationalization of spirituality’, which can be found in popular culture and its myriad 
subcultures. As is evidenced in a massive literature straddling cultural studies, leisure studies 
and sociology, subcultures burst onto the scene in no uncertain terms at the beginning of the 
second half of the twentieth century and emerged in the form of life-worlds to do with 
leisure, consumer choices, lifestyles, with class, gender, generation and sexuality, and 
involvement in political movements also playing a key role. These two tendencies become 
the two metaphors of twenty-first century spiritualization: sport as a symbol of acrobatic 
achievement and popular culture as a locus of devotion which ‘covers the lives of 
contemporary individuals with unpredictable flashes of inner emergency’ (Sloterdijk 2010, 
38). 
 
Once discovered as metaphors of spiritualization, these two tendencies make palpable the 
difference between those who make something or often a great deal of themselves in their 
leisure and those who do not. Anthropotechnics rather than work becomes the test of the will 
of those of us who ‘must change our lives’ (which means all of us), the measure of our 
concentration, and the personal litmus test of our self-worth. As soon as we know this, we 
have no more need to ask why individuals fulfil themselves through action, through 
'acrobatics'. Anthropotechnics is less a plan of action than a practice. It is about living in a 
certain way.  We are not equipped to adopt a theoretical attitude to ourselves. Creative 
individuals fulfil themselves in their becoming, through action. We cannot know in advance 
the value or the consequences of our actions at the point of decision. Choice is not the issue 
of self-knowledge but an existential leap into our destiny (Heller 1996, 147). This is not the 
path laid down by anyone else. This is our path, the one we have chosen for ourselves. We 
have to follow this wherever it may lead us. It is through anthropotechnics that we pursue 
ourselves, that we hope to find ourselves in what we have created, meaning that what we 
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make in our leisure reflects us, not so much through an identity but something fundamental 
about us as a personality.  
 
For Sloterdijk, as for Foucault, the art of living is both at once an aesthetics of existence and 
an ascetics of existence. The point of ascetics is the same as the point of aesthetics: the 
creation of life as a work of art. He suggests that this duality is perhaps best captured in the 
term ‘spiritual life practice’. As we have seen, Sloterdijk differs from Marxist sociologists in 
not wanting to place the stress on work as the key category by which to understand this ‘self-
forming and self-enhancing behaviour’. He suggests that the discourse of work be reformed 
so that the individual is understood more like a trainer who administers his or her own talents 
and ‘drives the team’ of his or her own habits. Whether we call life practice the 'art of living' 
or 'self-design' and ‘virtuoso asceticism’ (Sloterdijk 2013) is purely a matter of taste. 
 
Each era determines the specific conditions, techniques, practices, moulding and self-shaping 
rules that constitute social life amongst committed and spiritually oriented individuals. As we 
have seen in our era it is sport and popular culture that are the guiding metaphors. These 
metaphors, sometimes used in combination, offer various forms of life practice that are 
developed with the aim of transforming the self and revolutionizing relationships to be 
‘other’. Individuals are driven by a sense of duty they feel to change their lives since they 
know what duty is. They have no intention of joining up with social groups that are a normal, 
part of the order of things. According to Sloterdijk, this is because committed individuals are 
those who set out to live as fuller life as possible.  
 
If in the twenty-first century we have to constantly make ourselves up, we also as a result 
have to constantly make ourselves at ‘home’, in some kind of community, because, as 
Sloterdijk (2011) argues, our becoming-in-the-world is never being alone; it is always 
becoming-with-others. It is demonstrated below that in twenty-first century leisure life-
worlds this leads to the transmogrification of community, which connects in an immediate 
way with issues of sincerity and authenticity in devotional leisure. As is demonstrated below, 
community is not a concept that has any precision, but it is a very useful one for all that. In 
fact, it is the most important concept for understanding leisure life-worlds today. As we will 
see, community can be put to use in unexpected ways that expand our sense of what it means 
for twenty-first- century individuals. In this regard I discuss below two kinds of 
‘communities’ found in devotional leisure: value-spheres and heterotopias.  
 
‘Devotional leisure’, value-spheres and skholē 
In Leisure (2010) I argued that in our era ‘devotional leisure’ practice is the means by which 
many of us attempt to fulfil the ambition to live as fuller life as possible. This the kind of 
leisure practice that appeals to the sixth-sense – that special way of seeing, whose doxa we 
cannot precisely put into words, but which provides us with our own unique window onto the 
world – which animates us to reach out towards some spiritual truth, higher than ourselves, 
that provides us with meaning and a purpose for living. 
 
To borrow some insights from Benjamin Crowe, what Heidegger said of religion is true of 
‘devotional leisure’ practice, it insists on the idea that meaning is hermeneutical and is passed 
down rather than constructed. In other words the meaning of ‘devotional leisure’ practice 
depends upon an unequivocal and straightforward response to an independent realm of 
meaning. What shapes a leisure life built on devotion and motivates those who commit 
themselves to it is self-evident as an experienced reality of the meaning of devotion. The crux 
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of ‘devotional leisure’, then, lies in ‘a way of being, of inhabiting a determinate ‘space’ or 
‘nexus [Zusammenhang]’ of meaningfulness’ (Crowe 2008, 65). The practices that go on in 
this space can be understood as a tradition, as a set of tacit agreements about meaning that 
grounds interpretation. As Crowe (2006, 248) points out, this ‘includes, above all, self-
interpretation. In this case, tradition gives shape and content to our identities’. 
 
‘Devotional leisure’ practice signifies obligation, responsibility, and especially desire. Since 
‘devotional leisure’ is hermeneutical – it is that rare thing whose stories of emancipation and 
of belonging are a single story – it presupposes that there is something about the leisure 
pertaining to our chosen devotional practice that cannot be disciplined – its secret (its 
unknown known). When we engage with leisure as a devotion we know that commitment to 
it is our duty, but its secret is beyond interpretation; we do not know, cannot know about its 
secret; rather we feel its warm glow, we sense it. Yet knowing all this does not stop us trying 
to find out its secret. To paraphrase Heller (1999, 144), the object of devotion is the ‘this-
ness, the ipseity’ of my chosen leisure practice that makes it distinctive from other freely 
chosen leisure practices. When we choose leisure in this way we do so with a sense of 
feeling, as though it were something holy, as though engaging in it were a religious function. 
There is more to leisure, this attitude would seem to suggest, than mere leisure activities or 
recreational pursuits; it is to live one’s life in certain way.  
 
What I have in mind when I use the term ‘devotional leisure’ practice is something like 
Weber’s (2008) idea of a value-sphere. Adopted from Weber’s belief that politics and science 
must be understood as autonomous or distinct realms of human activity, involving existential 
choice, which have their own ‘inherent dignity’ (Brubaker, 1984), the idea of a leisure life-
world as a value-sphere suggests that not only is leisure governed by particular set of norms, 
rules, ethics and obligations that are inherent, but also that those who commit themselves to 
leisure often do so as a vocation; the relationship between their life and their leisure is 
fundamental.  
As is well known, Hegel argued that there are three spheres of human activity in modern 
societies – the family and intimate social relations, the numerous institutions of civil society 
and the state – each of which embodies its own particular kind of community and sociality 
(private and public), but it is the state that is the unifying power in society and the guarantor 
of ethical life (Heller, 1999). In contrast, Weber argued that modernity is marked by the 
absence of any such universal binding ethical power. It was his view that moderns have the 
freedom to connect with their own ethical powers which means that they have the ability to 
choose among a plurality of social spheres. However, he also stressed that this comes with a 
requirement of ‘all those who belong to one of these spheres that they acquire the values of 
their own sphere, and abide by the rules of this sphere as to their own binding ethical power’ 
(Heller 1999, 37). It is this sense that all social spheres in modern societies must also be 
understood as value-spheres. 
 
The concept of value-spheres defies the convention of thinking in totalities. In Weber’s view 
we have the freedom to choose among value-spheres, but we cannot join all of them, feasibly 
not even more than one sincerely and authentically since the ‘choice of a value-sphere is, 
namely, an existential choice. When one chooses a value-sphere, one chooses oneself as a 
man or a woman who is committed to this sphere’ (Heller 1999, 38). To choose this way of 
life is to both feel unconsciously at home in a leisure life-world and to succeed in becoming 
someone in the world, that is, someone distinctive. It is to become an individual de facto, to 
acquire a personality, a set of features and a leisure life that firmly locates one in a home, as a 
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member of a community, but also which sets one apart in it by making one memorable for 
what one does, says or is.  
 
The absorption into the inner circle of any leisure value-sphere can only be accomplished 
through a protracted investment of time and emotional effort, which taken together adds up to 
existential freedom and imaginative ownership. Thus, we begin to learn the secret of our 
devotion and the leisure domain becomes really ours. And yet, despite how familiar we may 
become with our chosen vocation, the magic continues, each encounter with it another step 
towards the realization of sincerity and authenticity. Sincerity and authenticity here are 
hermeneutical and must be communicated through a struggle, through a connection of the 
ways ‘I’ say ‘yes’ to my vocation. ‘Devotional leisure’ is like religion and art, it is a value-
sphere that ‘can disclose Truth and provide life with Meaning’ (Heller, 1999: 38). 
 
‘Devotional leisure’ in this sense might be understood as a hermeneutic tradition that is 
always in the process of being reassessed as it is reused, meaning it is craftmanship-like. The 
word crafts, derived from the old English, meaning skills, refers to a particular set of abilities 
that are driven by human curiosity, unhurriedness and dedication to a job well done. What 
this suggests is that craftsmanship is creative only because it is facilitated by a particular kind 
of leisureliness. As Richard Sennett has suggested, what is also craftsman-like is ‘the desire 
to do something for its own sake’, which epitomizes the special human condition of being 
engaged. Sennett (2008) argues that three abilities are the basis of craftsmanship: the ability 
to localize, the ability to question, and the ability to open up. When these three elements are 
combined we are capable of producing works of art which are not only of stunning quality, 
but which also carry with them the key to their production. As Weber (2008, 34) said:  
 
A work of art that attains real “fulfillment” will never be surpassed, and will never 
become obsolete; the individual may assess its significance for himself variously, but 
no one will ever be able to say of a work that attains real “fulfillment” in the artistic 
sense that it has been “surpassed” by another one that also attains “fulfillment’. 
 
What this tells us is that 'devotional leisure' practice is another word for skholē, otherwise 
known as 'the free time, freed from the urgencies of the world, that allows a free and liberated 
relation to those urgencies and the world (Bourdieu 2000, 1). Perceiving the unique value of 
the art of living, the skholēr also finds and creates unique value within him or herself. The 
sense of this quality in both parties, the skholēr and the leisure life-world through which he or 
she finds fulfillment, is a precondition for a special kind of intimacy. This is because value-
spheres operate on the basis of collaboration rather than competition; their adherents 
complete together rather than compete against one another.   
‘Devotional leisure’ practices are special cases of democratic interpretation. In Leisure (2010) 
I identified Spracklen’s (2009) study of the ‘self-referencing community’ built around black 
metal music as a good example of this kind of interpretation in which action is 
communicative. But the list of leisure practice that has the potential to become devotional is 
endless since these days any kind of leisure is potentially and actually a devotional practice 
because today interpretation is located in popular culture – sometimes even in the market. In 
this regard we should not forget that leisure value-spheres are hermeneutic communities that 
first and foremost serve the convenience of their members. 
Let us look at an example of what I have in mind. William Finnegan argues in his memoir 
Barbarian days: a surfing life, surfing unites all those who have ever made their spiritual 
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home in that world. To paraphrase him, every surfer has a different experience, but all those 
who inhabit surfing know that out there in the ocean everything is disturbingly interlaced 
with everything else. Waves are the playing field. They are the goal. They are the object of 
your deepest desire and adoration. At the same time, they are your adversary, your nemesis, 
even your mortal enemy. The surf is your refuge, your happy hiding place, but it is also a 
hostile wilderness – a dynamic, indifferent world. The ocean is like an uncaring God, 
endlessly dangerous, power beyond measure (2015, 18-9). For surfers the ocean is the place 
where they desire to return, again and again, and where they always return, to repeat the same 
unrepeatable experience.  This is another way of saying that surfing experience is a leisure-
life lived. 
As a form of skholē, ‘devotional leisure’ also performs an important educational function. In 
various and divergent forms it evinces a cognitive sensibility that leads to the establishment 
its own educational ‘field’ inhabited by myriad interpreters  who might be understood 
variously as deeper and wider ‘expert’ analysts, as skholērs. What is conveyed by these 
skholērs in the pedagogy of surfing is not just its technical aspects, but an aura of respect for 
the discourse that surrounds the subculture itself.  
 
What this tells us is that ‘devotional leisure’ experience is consistently in the process of being 
shared amongst those who choose to dwell in the value-sphere. In fact, when skholērs come 
together in value-spheres there is also a wholesale democratizing of the group. Absolute 
spirit, Hegel said, is about remembrance and recollection (Heller, 2011). Remembrance and 
recollection is hermeneutics in action – a way not only of sharing experiences from the past 
but of re-living them in the present. The gap between the past and its reconstruction in the 
present might be unbreachable, but it is through remembrance and recollection that we 
encounter this impossibility and in so doing maintain the absolute spirit of our communion. 
In this regard, Finnegan argues that surfing has its own ‘surf-photo compulsion’. Surfers 
photographs act not only as keepsakes about what rides on the waves feel like, but as 
confirmation of the evidence of having participated in the act, of having participated in it. As 
Finnegan puts it, photographs hang ‘in the homes of their subjects, framed like religious 
icons’ (p. 314). Even if the viewer was not literally there, the images produced in the 
photographs function as a means of inclusion. Finnegan’s memoir itself performs a similar 
function in the sense that it is testament to surfing experience that needs to be remembered 
even when it was not experienced together. The visitors of the spiritual home together re-
enter this home as a congregation and, in reflection and discussion, keep the vision of their 
spiritual home alive.  
There are further implications as well. ‘Devotional leisure’ practice, shaped by globalization 
and technology, transforms value-spheres in ways unimaginable to earlier generations. So 
whereas once upon a time surfing had religious import and surfboards were made by 
craftsman local to Hawaii and constructed using specialist wood from koa and wiliwili trees, 
today surfing is a global leisure value-sphere and surfboards are manufactured and 
constructed using a variety methods which range from polystyrene covered with layers of 
fibreglass to state of the art carbon fibre technology. Although the application of innovative 
technology to surfboard production goes on unabated, there is still a strong element of 
craftsmanship involved in surfing, and not just in the development of surfboard technology.  
Yet as Finnegan's book demonstrates, leisure value-spheres are spiritual homes whose 
members remain highly skilled skholērs, who, in acknowledging their acceptance in the 
surfing community, must also be prepared to offer instruction and guidance that is of true 
benefit to other surfers. This refers to the duties involved in the act of giving and receiving or 
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gift exchange (Mauss, 2002). This is as a form of skills and knowledge exchange that 
reinforces the social solidarity of those who choose to make their home together in a leisure 
value-sphere. This is because the major needs of leisure value-spheres are neither progressive 
nor accumulative but concerned, to repeat, with companionship and solidarity which together 
provide the necessary conditions in which individuals render meanings to their joys and 
sufferings, through the connection of the ways ‘I’ say ‘yes’ to my vocation; that is, we keep 
ourselves culturally alive through the continuous absorption and digestion of the spiritual 
nourishment that our value-sphere cooked up in the past and continues to serve us in the 
present. 
Devotional leisure as ‘performative leisure’ 
 
Like Heidegger, Sloterdijk argues that no practice can exist unless it is practiced by the many. 
But ascetical practices can take two very different forms. In this regard, the human subject 
needs to be understood as a carrier of ‘toughening’ exercises’ and ‘un-toughening’ exercises. 
While the latter are favoured by ‘habitus-controlled agents’, on the inactive practicing side, 
the ‘no persons', content to live their lives in the ‘human zoo’, the former are pursued by the 
‘acrobats’, on the active practicing side, who strive for what Sloterdijk in various places of 
his book calls  ‘self-governance’, ‘self-mastery’ and ‘self-display’.  
 
With the death of God, argues Sloterdijk, it ‘suddenly became possible to turn the attribute 
'living' into a superlative and to multiply the noun 'life ' by itself. Whoever says 'life' will 
sooner or later also say 'life of life'. Then, however, 'learning for life' means learning for pure 
surplus’ (2013, 200). Here Sloterdijk is describing in general terms the perfectionist 
tendencies of humans which are developed not so much to surpass their creator, but to 
surpass themselves. What this leads him to suggest is that there is as a result in humans an 
inbuilt sense of vertical mobility, and this means that whenever we encounter people, we will 
always find 'acrobats'.  
 
Sloterdijk is primarily concerned with committed individuals who are drawn to changing life 
for its own sake. In particular, he identifies with those who push themselves in their leisure to 
extremity, who commit themselves wholly to self-transformation, beyond what seems 
reasonable. It is suffering that excites these individuals. Pain breaks them open and lets other 
people in; suffering is the core of what it means to be human. And yet individuals are able to 
achieve all this in a way that seems effortless: ‘Whoever has practised properly overcomes 
the improbability of good and allows virtue to seem like second nature. Second natures are 
dispositions of ability that enable humans to stay on their level as artistes of virtus. They 
perform the near impossible, the best, as if it were something easy, spontaneous and natural 
that virtually happens of its own accord’ (ibid, 184).  
 
As Sloterdijk explains: 
 
The technical definition of practice I have posited opens up a first approach to the 
phenomenon of involuntary verticality. In every performance of practicing, an action is 
carried out in such a way that its present execution co-conditions its later execution. We 
could say that all life is acrobatics, although we perceive only the smallest part of our 
vital expressions as what they really are: the results of practice and elements of a modus 
vivendi that happens on the high wire of improbability (2012: 8). 
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That twenty-first century life can involve the fulfilment of the desire for ‘verticality’ in spite 
of the obstacle of being ‘ordinary’ to become simply ‘human beings’ is testament not only to 
the democratic nature of ‘performative leisure’ but also of individuals who manage to make a 
great deal of themselves. Spencer Seabrooke is a young man who has pursued a number of 
‘performative leisure’ practices with determination since a very young age. For Seabrooke, 
the dichotomy between life and art no longer exists. His life is nothing other than the hard-
won art of being true to his personality, doing normal things like doing manual labour for 
living, as well as less normal things like extreme sport. Seabrooke knows full well too what it 
takes to break away from ‘horizontal’ effort, that is to say, imitation and the nurturing of 
routine, to fulfil the human desire for ‘verticality’ – the desire to walk with apparent effortless 
abandon the way he did 5 months after the BIL conference when he broke the slacklining 
world record by making his way across a 305-metre deep gully at the Stawamus Chief in 
Squamish, British Columbia on 2nd August 2015 (Schmunk, 2015).  
 
Fundamentally, the practising life is ascetic. As Seabrooke said after breaking his world 
record: ‘The day I started slacklining was the day I started training’. Asceticism is the term 
Sloterdijk uses to encompass all those exercises and forms of self-discipline which are 
necessary to training for the practising life.  Asceticism is regarded as a prerequisite for the 
higher reaches of secular spiritual life, particularly the dimension of performativity, which are 
conditioned by powers which ‘flow into the intensification of the practising subject, which 
progresses to ever higher levels of a purely performative mode of being in the course of the 
exercises. What was once called the vita contemplativa to contrast it with the vita activa is, in 
fact, a vita performativa’ (Sloterdijk 2013, 212).  
 
As Spencer Seabrooke is no doubt aware from the moment he puts his first foot on the 
slackline he must be ready since it is not only tests his ability to keep his balance on the 
slackest foundation, but it is also there to show that if he is not too sure of himself, he will 
fall. As he put it after crossing the gully at the Stawamus Chief, ‘When you're at the edge, it's 
so grippingly terrifying that your body wouldn't even let you do it unless you were ready’ 
(cited in Schmunk, 2015). It is in this regard that slacklining, as a form of 'acrobatics', is a 
useful metaphor for understanding performative leisure. But in Sloterdijk’s view, human life 
itself is just like slacklining in that it is ‘an acrobatic achievement, and no one can say with 
certainty what training provides the necessary skills to master this discipline. Hence the 
acrobat no longer knows what exercises keep him from falling – aside from constant 
vigilance’. This democratization of the artist’s life which is heavily dependent on practice and 
learned skills by no means indicates a loss of the significance of this phenomenon; on the 
contrary, so argues Sloterdijk, it reveals how such practices nowadays ‘affect all aspects of 
life’ (2013, 63). This is why in his view the ideal metaphor for ‘normality’ is acrobatic 
exercise. 
 
It is not enough, however, to walk the slackline and perform the salto mortale at a great 
height. As Sloterdik explains: 
 
the acrobat's decisive message lies in the smile with which he bows after the 
performance. It speaks even more clearly in the nonchalant and gesture before his exit, 
the gesture one could take for a greeting to the upper tiers. In reality, it conveys a moral 
lesson: for our like, that is nothing. Our like – meaning those who have completed the 
course in impossibility, with making an impression as a subsidiary subject (ibid, 196).  
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What this tells is that the imperative ‘You Must Change Your Life’ also entails taking 
yourself seriously by turning yourself into an object of admiration.  This dual position yields 
the image of what Sloterdijk (2013, 329) calls an ‘ontological hybrid’:  
 
a theatre director who has been condemned to a practising self-reference from early on, 
and now faces the task of realizing the script of their own existence on stage and 
observing how others observe them. One can now say it explicitly: in Homo artista, the 
agent and the observer merge to form a single dynamic dual. 
 
In other words, it is not enough to have achieved great heights in ‘performative leisure’, it is 
also important to have done so in a way that is ‘fit to stand the gaze of millions’ which David 
Foster Wallace argues is ‘the unconscious reinforcement of the deep thesis that the most 
significant quality of truly alive persons is watchableness, and that genuine human worth is 
not just identical with but rooted in the phenomenon of watching’ (1993, 155).  This 
phenomenon implies a particular relationship between an audience and a performer. 
 
Performative leisure and community: khôra and heterotopia 
 
One of the major differences between the two kinds of devotional leisure is that whereas 
‘devotional leisure’ has a hermeneutic tradition, ‘performative leisure’ does not. As we have 
just seen, ‘devotional leisure’ follows the path of an identifiable vocation which finds 
absolute spirit home-experience as a value-sphere and as such it carries a historical weight 
that is dense with meaning but is still open to further interpretability.  In ‘performative 
leisure’, devotion alone is the basis of authority since it is a kind of devotional leisure 
practice that has no hermeneutical tradition; this means that it can only speak for itself.  
 
That may be so. But we have to recognize that ‘performative leisure’ might offer other kinds 
of communal possibilities. In other words we must not rule out the possibility of there being 
differing interpretations of devotional leisure by those who find themselves in the midst of an 
alternative kind of ‘community’ that makes it possible to think about absolute spirit home-
experience in a different way. Clearly, though, in the case of ‘performative leisure’ which is a 
kind of devotional leisure practice that is not exemplified in hermeneutics, one is engaged in 
an effort of understanding that is not without difficulties since as we have seen there is the 
tacit assumption that devotion alone is the basis of authority.  
 
So what ‘community’ is in this instance is difficult to say. Another way of articulating this, to 
paraphrase John Caputo (1997: 84), might be to express the view that the trouble with 
‘performative leisure’ is that it is based on a kind of ‘community’ that is unknown to us since 
‘it belongs neither to the intelligible nor to the sensible world’ of ‘devotional leisure’ 
exemplified in hermeneutics, in skholē. It is in this sense, as Plato would have said, “hardly 
real”. That is, it is ‘not a legitimate son of reason but is apprehended by a spurious or 
corrupted logos, a hybrid or bastard reasoning. [It] is neither intelligible being nor sensible 
becoming, but a little like both, the subject matter of neither a true logos nor a good mythos’. 
In other words, ‘performative leisure’ is situated too low on skholē’s conceptual radar to be 
taken credibly. In differentiating between knowable ‘devotional leisure’ activities that take 
place at society’s centre and unknowable ones that do not, we can’t quite bring ourselves to 
name ‘performative leisure’ as a devotional leisure activity or as a community of ‘skholērs'..  
 
But what if we tried to understand the ‘community’ associated with ‘performative leisure’ in 
another way, as khôra, that ‘pre-philosophical, pre-originary non-locatable non-space that 
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existed without existing before the cosmos’ (Lucy 2004, 68), that is set beyond translation 
and can’t be defined or explained but which provides a ‘home’ for all things? As Lucy 
explains, khôra is ‘almost but not quite’ the Ancient Greek word for “anything goes” which 
resists any attempt to pin it down conceptually owing to its ‘textual drift’ (Derrida 1995, 
123). This begs two important questions: Where is the khôra (the ‘home’ for all things) that is 
‘hardly real’ but is always on the move?  Who are its inhabitants (those khôrasters who move 
from ‘home’ to ‘home’ without any difficulty since they choose to live in the absolute 
present)? 
 
‘Performative leisure’ exemplifies the kind of openness suggested by the khôra, as a liminal 
in-between place, in a particularly interesting way, since it breaks with the tradition of 
‘devotional leisure’ dramatically – or, at least, the ways in which its ‘performers’ (khôrasters) 
express themselves and their mutual sense of belonging in a way that differs dramatically 
from community in the hermeneutical tradition exemplified in skholē. By example, it brings 
to the fore the question of how these khôrasters relate to the freedom of their devotion – a 
performative union as it might be called, a gathering of drifting performers united in a 
common spirit that emerges in that ‘shadowy realm called khôra’ (Caputo, 1997: 93) as the 
intersection of the pursuit of risk in the hope of finding some kind of transcendence beyond 
the limit of everyday life situations and the approval of what might be described (very 
loosely) as a ‘community’. 
 
Foucault gave the name to this ‘community’ (unworthy of the name hermeneutic community) 
heterotopia.  Too complex for rational interpretation, yet at the same time seemingly a tabula 
rasa for all individuals’ desires, heterotopias are ‘disturbing’ for hermeneutics as they are 
traditionally practiced as skholē, 
 
probably because they secretly undermine language, because they make it impossible to 
name this and that, because they shatter or tangle common names, because they destroy 
‘syntax’ in advance, and not only the syntax with which we construct sentences but also 
that less apparent syntax which causes words and things (next to and also opposite one 
another) to ‘hold together’….[H]eterotopias …desiccate speech, stop words in their 
tracks, contest the very possibility of grammar at its source; they dissolve our myths 
and sterilize the lyricism of our sentences (Foucault, 1970: xix).  
Foucault (1984) identifies two main categories of heterotopia. There are the pre-modern 
heterotopias of crisis, otherwise known as ‘elsewhere’ places which tended to be relegated to 
the margins of modern societies. Foucault has in mind here privileged places such as single-
sex boarding schools where young boys are taken through a sexual rite of passage that is 
neither homosexual nor heterosexual; sacred places such as pilgrimage sites; and forbidden 
places such as brothels. In assessing the ways in which these ‘elsewhere’ places have been 
transformed in modern societies, Foucault offers his second category of heterotopia, which at 
their most basic are the places of deviance, such prisons and mental asylums, where those 
considered ‘abnormal’ by the standards of modern norms can be spatially isolated. 
In developing a more elaborate conception of this second category of heterotopia, Foucault’s 
analysis suggests that these ‘elsewhere’ places must be understood in relation to the kind of 
society in which they occur. Where value-spheres fit snuggly into reality; heterotopias do not. 
In any society there are some people for whom the ‘real world’ does not resonate with their 
own experiences. Even though we are indoctrinated into thinking that ‘this way, rather that 
that’ is the right way to live, we tacitly know it is mistaken. In other words, the real world 
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robs some people of the kind of fullness of life others are able to find in normalcy. The ‘real 
world’ is for these individuals at once too much and not enough. What Foucault’s analysis 
suggests is that a sense of recompense for a life that is not being lived in the confines of the 
‘real world’ leads people down the track of heterotopia: reality and rationality are not on their 
menus, since what they are after is an unmediated immediacy of something together out of 
the ordinary.  
To this extent heterotopias tend to come to life in pointillist time, which means they are 
experienced as episodic. They constitute sequestered spaces which have their very own 
systems of ‘opening and closing’ that both isolate them from the rest of society and operate to 
exclude those who do not have the necessary credentials to enter. In so doing heterotopias, 
function by way of opposition; that is they have a tendency to unfold ‘between two extreme 
poles’. However, heterotopia offers spaces of compensation (rather than the illusion of 
utopia) and as such functions in relation to the way that its (deviant) populations understand 
they are imagined by the rest of society. In heterotopia individuals do not try to resist reality 
so much as escape it – and in so doing creatively find their own place in it. 
Beneath the calm surface of everyday social reality flow strong and deadly currents. Against 
sad obscurity, against surrender to societal norms, against normalcy, heterotopia suggests 
desire for an alternative kind of knowledge, for another kind of determination, for ragtag 
unyielding life, the kind of worlds that provide expression and shelter for the ones who 
choose to escape meaning there. Heterotopias are a feast for anyone hungry for the otherness 
of ‘reality’. Their incumbents create spectacular spaces in which ‘reality’ itself seems to 
dissolve under the pressures of desire and we are left with individuals who shape-shift 
personalities as their compulsions are let loose.  Whoever seeks out a heterotopia knows that 
once they arrive there, they will find a special kind of freedom in line with Sartre’s 
observation in The Imaginary that ‘every consciousness posits its object, but each does so in 
its own way’. ‘Community’ made to the measure of heterotopic social space is made for 
individuals first and foremost: what goes on ‘in aesthetic space, is, essentially, a solitaire. 
Whatever sharing there seems to be is incidental and purely superficial...’ (Bauman 1993, 
178).  
 
Let us have a look at an example of what I have in mind. In Blackshaw and Crabbe’s (2004) 
discussion of car cruising as a heterotopia familiar urban spaces metamorphose as two 
different ontological flows fold into one and we witness an exemplary conversion of an 
ordinary life into a form of theatre. Adapted from customary usage as ‘making trips by sea 
for pleasure’ into slang employ, cruising is the term used to connote either walking or driving 
around a locality on the lookout for quick and anonymous sex, or with specific reference to 
car cruising, which involves a number of other interconnected leisure activities and forms 
stylistic expression, but particularly the parading and racing of motor cars. Blackshaw and 
Crabbe argue that car cruising is a heterotopian leisure practice with its own kind of detached 
existence, of being ‘in’ but not ‘of the space it temporarily occupies. They also contend that 
car cruising is perceived by both cruisers and wider society as ‘deviant’ leisure activity as 
much without a history as it is one without a future and that car cruises are ‘communities’, 
whose inspiration tends to spring from the performativity of individual cruisers: they are both 
events for consumption and things to be consumed by. The affiliation found at cruises is not 
really one of friendship, or of a community proper, but one of symbiosis and its only glue is 
cruisers’ insatiable appetites to connect with like-minded others.  
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If cruises are not the ‘real stuff’ of conventional communities, neither are they institutions, 
nor even organizations. They are what Lash (2002) has called ‘disorganizations’, those more 
‘trivial’ forms of social interaction, which constantly come into being and just as quickly 
break off, maintained ‘until further notice’.  As such, Blackshaw and Crabbe suggest that car 
cruising is made to the measure of heterotopia: a momentary stopping place more for gestures 
than consequences, of uncomplicated surface lives manufactured only for the time being, 
paraded in and for performative community aching to be credible. Cruising is merely about 
performing modified cars, performing bodies. Yet despite its apparent simplicity cruising is 
difficult to locate. First, in its disorganization the culture of cruising is dislocated in no place 
in particular; it is always on the move and the theatre for its performativity is always at an 
improvised stage set. Second, cruising is about the mundane rituals of displaying and 
checking out each other’s motor cars and bodies (car cruising is scented with sex) and on the 
other hand it is centred on street racing. However, both these activities are closely related in 
the sense that each is about performativity: a hybrid world where the mundane quotidian of 
performativity – display, gossip and tittle-tattle – collides with the apocalyptic and 
spectacular performativity of street racing and  
the performativity of ‘modded’ kit with flashing lights, the resounding sound of smooth 
clutch plate, purring 24-valve engines, the nitrous blue squirt of purge kit, skirts, 
spoilers, six-speed gear boxes, alloys and burning rubber. Even the interiors of the cars 
[are] instruments of performativity: chrome floor plates, leather seats, bucket seats, and 
chain-mail steering wheels, wicked ICE with speakers blasting out drum and bass….It 
[is] a hive of activity. Drivers intermittently [rattle] about at full pelt. Groups and 
couples [assess] each other and each other’s cars, admiringly, ears pricking up and eyes 
lifting only at the sound of a noisy ‘Shaguar’ zooming into the arena, whence a queue 
of attentive onlookers instantly [form], buzzing over the open bonnet. This cruise [is] 
quickly turning into a great river of an event and everybody [seems] irresistibly carried 
away with its flow (Blackshaw and Crabbe 2004, 136). 
This contrast of significance and absurdity, of the spectacular and the mundane, the public 
and the private is what, for its followers, makes this devotional leisure practice worthwhile. 
Car cruising, like all other heterotopias, is always a double: ‘it belongs neither to the 
intelligible nor to the sensible world’, but to that ‘shadowy realm called khôra’, the ‘home’ 
for all things that is ‘hardly real’ but is always on the move. Car cruisers are also always a 
double. At the end of every cruise, few of these ‘khôrasters’, who choose to perform their 
cars and themselves in the absolute present, can remember what it was they were actually 
caught up with, apart from the pleasure or the emotion of the episode. Before we consider the 
implications of these observations for the relationship between self-realization and 
‘community’ and how this connects with the issues of sincerity and authenticity in 
‘performative leisure’ we must first of all clarifying a number of issues. In order to do this, let 
us first of all look at another example of heterotopia, this time at the ‘extreme edge’ of 
‘performative leisure’.  
In heterotopia nothing is straightforward. Because hermeneutics is absent words have their 
own usages, and nothing is ever never quite settled. As we saw in the discussion of car 
cruising, make-believe is pervasive, often the custom. Leisure heterotopias belong to the 
‘communities’ that create and use them. They represent alternative kinds of cognitive, social 
and moral space, emerging not from established imaginative traditions, but instead from the 
pursuit of mutual passion, pleasure and purpose, dignified and elevated by the ingenuity of 
their sense of invention and the centrality of this to the lives of those present. These leisure 
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heterotopia provide access to radically different existential possibilities, and thereby expand 
what is meant or could mean to be human, by giving reality to what ‘the real world’ cannot 
quite grasp, to what it wishes wasn’t there, or to what it fears. 
 
Dissolving the dichotomy of ‘devotional leisure’ and ‘performative leisure’: the example 
of urban exploration  
 
As a final example, let us briefly look at urban exploration, the focus of Kevin Bingham’s 
(2017) doctoral study, the devotional leisure practice he suggests has recently entered popular 
culture through the adventures of those like-minded individuals interested in the physical 
discovery of abandoned buildings, bridges, churches, graveyards, drains, power stations, 
subways and other man-made objects which are abandoned or off-limits. Urban exploration, 
Bingham suggests, is infused with a sensitivity to the environmental degradation found in 
modernity’s fading cityscapes, whose haunted past not only excites urbexers’ aesthetic 
speculations but also presents them with physical challenges – often risky and sometimes 
hostile – which they look to transcend. 
 
Drawing on his own ethnographic research in UK, Australia and New Zealand, Bingham’s 
thesis argues that, in attempting to transcend the urban environment in this way, urbexers are 
all trespassers in the sense that they cross the boundary of what is legal to occupy a deviant 
leisure space. But also, in the sense that they cross a creative boundary by turning themselves 
against both the shallowness and manufactured certainty of consumerism and the risk averse 
world of conventional climbing and descending (including outdoor education). In so doing 
the hope is that urban exploration will enable urbexers to reveal more depth in exercising 
their talents while also enabling them to establish an outcast identity. It is in this outcast role 
that urbexers long for respect and for acceptance and they pursue both uncompromisingly.  
 
The peculiar visibility-invisibility of urban exploration allows this. At a remove from the 
synopticon world of consumerism and the panopticon worlds of organized climbing and 
descending, urbexers seize the freedom to experiment off-limits. Liberated from the market 
and the normalizing gaze of the climbing and descending professions (e.g. mountaineering, 
potholing and caving councils and associations), with their formal affiliations and codes of 
professional conduct, urbexers not only give a new name to the practices associated with 
climbing descending but also to each other (Kevin’s ‘Boyz’ go by the names of Box, Ford 
Mayhem, MKD, Rizla Rider, The Hurricane), and together push the limits of the dominant 
morality. 
 
When one the ‘Boyz’ lifts the manhole cover and plummets down the drain into Sheffield’s 
sewer system a sense of falling quickly gives way to an alternative ontological flow and the 
everyday one disappears. He is transported elsewhere, into a place that is hidden but familiar, 
and which facilitates a personal quest for meaning. Now other things matter. The sounds of 
fetid water dripping and the dank smell in the air. The circumstances of the ‘Boyz’s’ removal 
from one world to another is felt as fantastical; existentially, their situation is a familiar one, 
but real in a different kind of way. Each one of them now feels radically of a place, at one 
with the aesthetics of abandonment and the others who inhabit it with him; everyone else here 
sees the world the way that the rest of the ‘Boyz’ does and revels in the smells the self-same 
way that they do. For each of the ‘Boyz’’ it isn’t only the world that is now recognizably his, 
but also his body is too: this miraculous metamorphosis, out of his everyday body and into 
another version of that same body which is still his but in this alternative reality is really his. 
The world of urban exploration the ‘Boyz’ find themselves in is still the world as we know it, 
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except it isn’t the same, because it is uncanny. It is khôra. It is a demonstration of freedom, 
an incitement to emancipation. 
 
To paraphrase Caputo (1997, 94), urban exploration, in common with many other devotional 
leisure practices, takes khôra off the streets and provides it with a home in the holy family of 
devotional leisure, somewhere between the intelligible and the sensible, aesthetically 
evocative, just as much relying on its performativity for its formal qualities as well its 
craftsmanship contributions. The ‘Boyz’ are khôrasters- skholērs extraordinaire. Under-
imagined urban spaces act as metaphors for the parts of themselves that urbexers are not 
prepared to supress or ignore. In other words, urbexers set out to explore the other side of the 
urban environment and, by extension, the other side of themselves rather than to take either 
for granted. One half of the urbex character is charged with a sense of theatricality typically 
found in the pursuit of intense moments of experience and the performativity of daredevil 
exploits which together make urbexers feel ‘real’ as individuals and gives them their own 
personal urbex identity; the other half, charged with the need to join in, to gain the acceptance 
and respect of other urbexers. Sincere and authentic urbexers, Bingham’s thesis suggests, 
instinctively understand both processes. 
 
To borrow an expression from Judith Butler (1990), it is in its performativity that urban 
exploration ‘generates that which it names’.  This is not to say that someone who declares ‘I 
am an urbexer’ does at that moment become an urban explorer. In saying ‘I am an urbexer’ 
someone may be at the beginning of the process of the social recognition of a new status, but 
saying ‘I am an urbexer’ is not being an urbexer. In Austin’s terminology (1975) 
accomplished urban exploration requires its own ‘felicity’ conditions. The statement ‘I am an 
urbexer’ requires that three verification conditions be met:  ‘authority’, ‘sincerity’ and 
‘authenticity’ of commitment in subsequent urban exploration exploits.   
 
First, urban exploration is known by the fruits it harvests. To be officially entitled to call 
themselves an ‘urbexer’ someone must achieve the preparatory conditions of urban 
exploration. That is, they must act in a way that leads to them being officially authorized by 
the rest of the urban exploration community. Second, in saying ‘I am an ‘urbexer” someone 
must also mean what they say, believe it to be true sincerely. In this regard, individuals must 
not only be genuinely grateful in acknowledging their acceptance in the urban explorer 
community, but when required must also be prepared to offer instruction and guidance that is 
of true benefit to other ‘urbexers’. Finally, becoming an authentic ‘urbexer’ means meeting 
the essential condition of urban exploration. This involves being obliged to the promise that 
urban exploration presents; that is, to  make a promise is to say ‘yes’ to urban exploration, to 
make an affirmation, a social commitment to a community. You can’t just say ‘I am an 
‘urbexer” and leave it at that. The words are not enough. It is not enough to say, ‘I am an 
‘urbexer” – you must live your life as an ‘urbexer’.  Needing to become an ‘urbexer’ is the 
essential condition of what an urban explorer is. In this regard, and just like surfers, urbexers 
are in love with storytelling – just as they take photographs of their exploits and share these 
on the internet, they also tell each other tales about their exploits. Their shared devotional 
leisure practice and their community is honed in this retelling. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In the interregnum that got underway in no uncertain terms in last few decades of the 
twentieth century our relationship with enchantment changed irrevocably as many people 
began to awaken to the new sense of existence associated with the art of living. This marked 
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the onset of an indeterminate historical period when it seemed that everyone now felt it was 
within their grasp to begin the search for some overarching narrative for their lives. It was 
also argued that as a result of the shift from solid modernity to liquid modernity leisure 
emerges for many people as source of enchantment, a kind of spiritual practice, what 
Sloterdijk calls anthropotechnics. Using this metaphor Sloterdijk suggests that the art of 
living is less a plan of action than a practice. It is about living your life in a certain way, 
which enables you to render your life meaningful or simply delight in it by putting it on 
display.  
 
Twenty-first century men and women are artists of life who have to make themselves up; 
they also as a result have to make themselves at ‘home’. One of modernity’s most ‘homely’ 
terrains is leisure – not just because it may offer us a personal fulfilment, but because it is a 
‘home’ with a social dimension which brings with it a sense of belonging and obligation to 
the wider social context that makes it possible. In other words leisure is the most ‘homely’ of 
modernity’s ‘homes’ because it is not only an experience but also an activity. It was argued 
that devotional leisure ‘homes’ are communities that take the form of either value-spheres or 
heterotopias. While the former provide ostensibly permanent ‘homes’ for those who pursue 
the meaning of life through ‘devotional leisure’, the latter provide temporary ‘homes’ for 
those are more concerned with the manner, the style in which they live their lives, which is 
‘the most significant quality of truly alive persons’. The resulting ‘felicity conditions’ are 
advantageous to individuals and the leisure life-worlds they share with others since they 
know that their devotion can provide them with access to the immediacy of that compelling 
attribute of ‘watchableness’ and the opportunity to give their lives a ‘density of meaning’, 
without relinquishing either. 
 
Perhaps the most radical conclusion to be drawn from this thesis is that devotional leisure is 
actually the art of living. Like all other works of art, the art of living is also always a double; 
it is shaped by khôrasters and skholērs following two approved and practised life-strategies: 
this of felo de se aesthetic design (aka performativity) and that of immortalis interpretation 
(aka devotion). The former is a strategy geared towards revelation and the latter is a strategy 
geared towards conservation and restoration, of adapting new art forms from older ones. 
Some devotional leisure life-worlds may play one up and play the other down; but all 
devotional leisure life-worlds deploy these two strategies. The former is positioned as an 
individual attribute and tends to surface spectacularly, but it is not fundamentally personal 
since all those who practise their devotion together have the potential to share in its 
achievement. The latter is positioned as a collective destiny, but it also serves as a vehicle fit 
for personal fulfilment.  
 
To borrow one last insight from Nietzsche (1954), someone who follows the path of 
devotional leisure, who becomes a personality, who is not only able to disrupt and transform 
established life practices by turning their own life into a work of art, is someone who is also 
able to achieve a reconciliation with the impermanent world.  This ‘tragic’ individual is a 
skholēr-khôraster who is able to combine the dispositions of ‘devotional leisure’ and of 
‘performative leisure’, who is able to sustain tough ascetic practices as well as imaginative 
aesthetic ones in their leisure while knowing that this combination of effort cannot in itself 
guarantee any desired results. This is because the secret of the meaning of life is unknowable 
and in the theatrical world of performativity ‘nothing is unimportant, because everything is 
important’. However the individual in question will have at least have the compensation of 
serving as a double, a go-between, a mediating figure, a cultural intermediary for the leisure 
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life-world that provides the conditions for the freedom of them and their culture. These two 
kinds of devotional leisure practice, which appear mutually exclusive and not always easily 
reconciled with each other, are perhaps best considered as aspects of a third endeavour, which 
I will call simply devotional leisure.   
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